See the remaining opening discussion in comment on 21:2–6 and the three questions and answers that immediately follow them.
See comment on 21:7–11, which focuses on the different aspects of the passage that lead to this question.
These verses make clear that servants are expected to fulfill their contractual obligations to their masters. For example male servants are expected to serve out their six-year term and to understand that there are financial implications if they choose to receive a wife from the master. In short masters have a right to see that financial obligations made toward them are kept, and servants are to be faithful in their responsibilities toward the master.
In today’s context the closest parallel to the servant-master relationship would be that of employee to employer. In that context the underlying question to ask would be, What does it mean for employees to be faithful to their contractual obligations to their employer? Christians in particular are exhorted to serve those over them in authority with such faithfulness and good character that it makes the gospel attractive (1 Tim. 6:1; Titus 2:9–10). A related question would be, What does faithfulness look like regarding any contractual obligation we have undertaken, whether in a work context or elsewhere? Christians are expected to be people of their word (cf. Ps. 15:4; Matt. 5:37) and in this way testify that they follow a God of truth.
While these laws provide safeguards for masters, they also provide significant protections for servants. Servanthood itself provides a way for those in debt to clear it while being part of a stable household. The six-year limit for male servants protects the person in debt from having to accept unreasonable conditions from his creditor. And female servants are protected from being sold like a piece of property, are in fact to be treated like a daughter, and are given rights of release if the master is unfaithful in his contractual responsibilities. All of this should make good sense to an Israelite. Since humans bear God’s image, they are worthy of being treated with justice, respect, and fairness. To take advantage of them in their weakness would be to disregard their nature as God’s image bearers.
As applied to the employee-employer relationship, the underlying question to ask would include, What does it look like for employers to treat their employees with justice, respect, and fairness as God’s image bearers? More specific questions might include, What accountability measures are in place if employers are not faithful in their contractual responsibilities? Are there currently accepted labor practices by which employers can take unfair advantage of vulnerabilities among employees—and which Christian employers should therefore reject? Christian employers especially are to remember that they are servants of the Lord, their heavenly master, and are to imitate him in the way they treat those under their authority (Eph. 6:9; Col. 4:1). Just as the Lord showed himself to be a kind and gracious master in redeeming the Israelites from slavery, so he has shown himself to be a kind and gracious master by redeeming us in Jesus. Those under our authority should experience the same kindness and grace from us.Exodus 21:1–11
Or servant; the Hebrew term ‘ebed designates a range of social and economic roles; also verses 5, 6, 7, 20, 21, 26, 27, 32 (see Preface)
Or so that he has not designated her
21:1 The Lord refers to the covenant stipulations that follow as “rules,” a word that refers elsewhere to binding regulations (v. 31; Lev. 18:4–5, 26; 24:22). These are not optional for Israelite behavior. By following them the Israelites will avoid behavior displeasing to their covenant King. What is more, the stipulations reflect principles and values that point to a positive ethic for the Israelites to embody, displaying their King’s character in the world.
21:2–6 Many of the initial stipulations are formulated as case laws. A case law begins by identifying a situation (or “case”) with an “if” or “when” clause. This is known as the protasis. It is followed by a clause, known as the apodosis, that describes what to do in that situation. Exodus 21:28 illustrates this form:
Protasis: “When an ox gores a man or woman to death”
Apodosis: “the ox shall be stoned”
The opening case laws deal with a Hebrew slave/servant, which ESV translates as “slave” but also notes “servant” as a possibility, since the Hebrew term ʿebed designates a range of social and economic roles. For some modern readers the term “slave” might call to mind the slave trade of past centuries in which slaves were often kidnapped and sold and thus viewed as chattel—property that masters could treat as they wished. Verse 16, however, forbids both the kidnapping and the selling of a kidnapped person (and makes either action a capital offense); following this law alone would have decimated most historical slave trading. In contrast,
In short, servants in Israel were seen not as chattel but as humans, made in God’s image and to be respected as such (Deut. 15:12–15 illustrates this perspective beautifully).
One of the most common causes of servitude was debt, causing the debtor to sell into servitude either himself (cf. Lev. 25:39–43, 47–55) or his children (cf. 2 Kings 4:1; Neh. 5:4–5). While such debt is never good, the protective nature of such servitude should be noted:
Because this was a commercial arrangement, language is used that is normally reserved for speaking of property, such as “buys” (Ex. 21:2). At first glance such language gives the impression that servants were dehumanized and thought of as mere property. But such a conclusion would ignore what has been noted above about a servant’s humanity and would also miss the fact that we use the same type of language in similar situations today.
The use of such language here is not to put servants on the level of furniture, any more than to say that “trading” sports stars puts them on the level of a stock.
As with many of the laws in chapters 21–22, this passage contains a series of case laws. Each case answers questions related to the commercial or financial aspects of servitude or marriage. The first questions are straightforward: What is the maximum length of a Hebrew servant’s term, and what might he owe at the term’s end? The answers are that the maximum term length is six years and that he owes nothing at the term’s end (21:2). The next question is also straightforward: What if he comes in single and does not marry? The answer is simple: he goes out single (v. 3). But now the questions become more complex. Stated most broadly, What if he is already married or gets married during his servanthood? The cases of verses 3–6 answer these questions. To understand these answers it must be remembered that marriage in ancient Israel was often preceded by a betrothal in which a gift would be given to the bride’s family. Such a gift enabled the legal transfer of the wife from her father’s household to her groom’s. It also entailed financial implications to betrothal and marriage, and those implications give rise to at least three specific questions that verses 3–6 answers.
First, if a man who becomes a servant is already married when he enters into servitude, what happens to his wife when his servitude is over? She goes with him, since he has already given any necessary betrothal gift (v. 3).
Second, what if he is given a wife from the master’s household and she has children? Since his being sold into servitude implied he had no financial means, he could not give a betrothal gift, meaning the woman (and any offspring she bore) was still legally part of the master’s household. Consequently, the man may not simply leave with them when his servitude is over (v. 4). Importantly, the law is not assuming that this is what the man will do (as v. 5 goes on to make clear); it simply focuses on the narrow question: In light of betrothal practice, to whose household do the wife and her children legally belong?
Third, is there anything the servant can do to keep his family together? Certainly! “If the slave plainly says, ‘I love my master, my wife, and my children,’” then he can become a permanent servant, in which case his service will make him part of the same household (vv. 5–6). The parallel passage in Deuteronomy makes clear the servant’s love for his master is due to the beneficial treatment the servant has received from him (Deut. 15:16), while the claim to love a wife and children is what Israelites would expect to be the reality. The thought of leaving without them (Ex. 21:4) is out of the question. In other words verse 4 makes clear to whose household the wife and children legally belong, but it is not sanctioning the husband’s leaving without them; verses 5–6 describe the action the husband is expected to take. Moreover, because this law is publicly known, it means that servants who accepted a wife from the master went into the situation with their eyes wide open (and had the freedom not to do so if they knew the master to be unkind). Indeed, given the servant’s financial situation, this may have been one of the only hopes he had of marrying and starting a family and thus may have been something he was eager to do (cf. note 460).
By way of summary, moderns are tempted to read this law as condoning chattel slavery, condoning a man’s abandonment of his wife and children, and forcing a slave into lifelong servitude if he wanted to keep his family. Set in its historical context, however, this law describes indentured servitude in order to clear a debt, assumes that the man would in fact stay with his wife and children out of his love for them, and assumes he willingly entered the marriage and the servitude that went with it in order to have a chance at having a family.
Two final comments may be made on some of the details in verses 2, 6. First, verse 2 sets an upper limit of six years on the period of service (for Lev. 25:41 cf. note 458). This is a helpful safeguard for the person in debt who could otherwise be forced to accept unreasonable conditions from the person holding the debt (cf. Jer. 34:8–22, where the Lord condemns Israelites for disregarding this very law and forcing permanent servitude upon fellow Israelites). At the end of the six years the debtor goes out “free” (i.e., as a free person, no longer a servant; see the use of the term in Deut. 15:12–13, 18) and the debt is discharged (he owes “nothing”). Second, regarding Exodus 21:6, debate exists whether to translate “His master shall bring him to God” or “His master shall bring him to the judges.” If the former (“to God”), the idea may be that the entire rite is carried out at a worship site, with God as divine witness, or that the matter is at least confirmed at a worship site, after which they return home and pierce the servant’s ear there. If the latter (“to the judges”), the idea may be that the rite takes place at an official place (such as the city gate), where the leaders of the community would gather or, again, that it is confirmed there and the ear-piercing then done at home. Of the two translations (“to God” and “to the judges”), normal usage favors the former since the relevant word usually refers to God (or in a pagan context to gods). Moreover, though in some passages the word possibly refers to judges or leaders (Ex. 22:8–9; Judg. 5:8; 1 Sam. 2:25; cf. BDB 43.1a), the data is not clear, leading many standard translations to maintain “God” (or “gods,” depending on the context) in some or all those passages. In either case, however, the goal of the rite is to make official the servant’s decision to enter into permanent servitude.
21:7–11 Having answered questions related to male Hebrew servants, the text now answers questions related to female Hebrew servants (that these servants are also Hebrew is implied in Ex. 21:8). To understand the text an important aspect of the social context must be kept in mind, namely, marriages in Israel were often arranged—that is, brides and grooms were chosen for each other by their families (or by servants acting on the family’s behalf; cf. Gen. 24:2–4). This is foreign today to most from the West, where marriage is thought of in terms primarily of romance, where an individual’s choices reign supreme, and where building a self-sustaining career as a single person is a readily available option for many. But the situation in Israel was entirely different.
To begin, prioritizing romance as the reason for marriage is a very modern way of thinking. In biblical times (and throughout much of history) the “various factors in a marriage to be weighed in the negotiations involved social parity, economic advantage and expansion of the kinship network.” This does not preclude romance, but it was not the leading factor.
Second, in contrast to modern individualism, Israelites thought corporately, bearing in mind the ways that their choice of marriage partner impacted their clan and tribe. Finally, building a self-sustaining career as a single person was both foreign to the Israelites’ family-centered way of thinking and, for most women in an ancient Near Eastern context, not a practical option (note how often “widows” are grouped alongside the poor and oppressed: Deut. 10:18; 14:29; 16:11; etc.). From this perspective ensuring one’s daughter had a home with her own family was not cruel but incredibly loving, especially for the poor, for whom the type of arranged marriage described here might be the only way to provide their daughter with a better life.
With that background in mind, we turn to the case laws in Exodus 21:7–11 and the questions they answer. Verse 7 describes the main case: a father has sold his daughter as a servant. The first question is simply, Does she, too, go out free in year seven (cf. v. 2)? The answer is no. Why not? Presumably, while a motivating factor for the father’s action was poverty (cf. Neh. 5:5), the overarching goal was an arranged marriage, as shown by the focus on marriage and marital rights in the laws that immediately follow (this distinguishes it from Deut. 15:12, where servitude more generally is addressed). In light of this, while she began as a maidservant, the end goal was always that she experience care and stability by becoming a permanent part of the household as a wife.
This understanding also sheds light on the questions answered by the laws in Exodus 21:8–11. First, what if she was to be the master’s wife (he had “designated her for himself”) but she was displeasing to him and he no longer wished to marry her? His canceling of the arranged marriage was considered an act of broken faith against her. (The Hb. for “break faith” is strongly negative, with connotations of treachery and deceit; cf. Pss. 59:5; 78:57; Prov. 11:3; Isa. 24:16. For a marriage context cf. Jer. 3:8, 11, 20; Mal. 2:14–16.) He could not sell her to a foreign people but had to let her be redeemed, that is, had to allow payment be given to release her (Ex. 21:8). Presumably this was done by her father or, if he was unable, by one of her relatives (cf. Lev. 25:47–49).
Second, what if the arranged marriage was between her and the master’s son? Then the master “shall deal with her as with a daughter” (Ex. 21:9), which could imply many things: he will make sure she has adequate food and clothing; he will not have sexual relations with her; he will treat her as a full family member, not a second-class one. In short, whether the marriage occurs immediately or is a few years away, he shall treat her as his own flesh and blood.
Third, what if he marries another wife? The word for “another” (ʾakher) can mean “another in addition to” (Gen. 8:10; 29:27), in which case he has already married the woman sold as a servant. However, the word can also mean “another instead of,” that is, a “different” one (Gen. 29:19; Num. 14:24; Deut. 24:2), in which case he has not married the servant woman. In favor of the second approach the final verse mentions release but no divorce (Ex. 21:11), suggesting no marriage has taken place. So what happens if he marries another woman instead of the servant? If her family is unable to redeem her and she stays (v. 8), the master must not reduce any of the physical provision he would have given her before the marriage (v. 10). This includes food, clothing, and “marital rights/habitation.” Debate surrounds the last of these. The Hebrew word (ʿonah) occurs only here in the OT, and the underlying root has several different meanings, leading to a variety of views as to its meaning. One use of the root refers to sexual relations, leading some to understand the term to refer to “marital (i.e. conjugal) rights.” Against this approach it may be noted that the use of the root is found in negative contexts as opposed to normal marital contexts (Gen. 34:2; Deut. 22:24, 29; Judg. 19:24; etc.), and, again, the law seems to presuppose marriage has not taken place. Another use of the root is related to “dwelling” (cf. Deut. 33:27), meaning the term in question would refer to shelter. In favor of this approach “shelter” naturally complements food and clothing and does not need to assume that marriage has taken place.
But a final question remains. What if the master is unwilling to continue to provide such food, clothing, and shelter? She is released from her servitude (Ex. 21:11); no redemption payment is needed, since he has been unfaithful in his responsibilities.
In short these laws provide tremendous protection for the woman who is sold as a servant for the eventual purpose of marriage. At every turn her rights are guarded and the master’s ability to wrong her (even through neglect) is restricted.