21:18–19 In the first case a quarrel leads to physical aggression, and one person is incapacitated (v. 18). If that person can recover (even if this involves time using a crutch), then the injuring party must pay the injured party for any missed work and make sure to give any necessary support until full healing takes place (v. 19). This implies that, if the injury is permanent, the guilty party must give ongoing support to whatever extent necessary to sustain the injured party.

21:20–21 Whereas verses 18–19 concern one citizen’s striking of another, verses 20–21 concern a master’s striking of his servant. Two cases are described. In the first the servant apparently dies during, or in very close proximity to, the master’s striking (v. 20).483 The master, however, does not have the right to kill his servant intentionally, and the servant is therefore to be “avenged” (v. 20), a term referring to hostile action taken against a wrongdoer on behalf of oneself or someone else (cf. Num. 31:2; Deut. 32:43). In most Pentateuchal uses of the term death is in view (Gen. 4:15, 24; Lev. 26:25; Num. 31:2; Deut. 32:43),484 and this seems likely here as well.485 The master is thus held to full account, presumably by one of the servant’s relatives, who would act as the “avenger of blood” and execute the guilty party (Num. 35:19).486

But this applies only if the master clearly intended to kill the servant. If the servant survived for a day or two and then died, no vengeance is allowed, since the master did not intend death (Ex. 21:21). It was manslaughter, not murder. As difficult as the thought may be for many today, the passage assumes that corporal punishment is within the rights of masters to administer.487 The historical context must be remembered. Day workers had intrinsic motivation to work hard and do a good job; otherwise they would not be rehired. Not so with servants, who were often working off a debt in the master’s household for a fixed period of time that did not change no matter how hard they worked. This meant there was not the same intrinsic motivation as day laborers to work hard, since masters were more or less stuck with them. Physical discipline was therefore a needed motivation at times for lazy servants. In this regard describing the servant as the master’s “money” is not to dehumanize the servant but to point to the fact that this is a commercial arrangement in which masters have the ability to administer corporal punishment.

It should immediately be noted, however, that, just because cases of manslaughter could occur, this did not mean that masters had the right to beat servants severely. As noted below (vv. 26–28), servants suffering permanent injury went free, thus discouraging masters from even heading in that direction. In short while verse 21 addresses cases of manslaughter that could occur, the surrounding laws put strong safeguards around servants by making clear that murdering a servant is a capital crime (v. 20) and that severely injuring them means they are to go free (vv. 26–27).

21:22–25 Two men are in the midst of a physical fight and one of them ends up hitting a pregnant woman. As a result, she either gives birth prematurely or miscarries (the word translated “come out” occurs in contexts of both live birth [Gen. 25:25; 38:29] and still birth [Num. 12:12]). The text does not specify which, though Sprinkle notes that premature births before modern medicine were often fatal and that the other ancient Near Eastern laws closest to this one appear to presume miscarriage (Ex. 21:22a).488

The text goes on to consider two different scenarios, one in verse 22 and the other in verses 23–25. Understanding them is complicated by two rare and disputed words. The term translated “harm” (Hb. ʾason) in verses 22–23 occurs in only three other verses, each time referring to the harm Jacob feared would happen to Benjamin (Gen. 42:4, 38; 44:29). The harm in view there is obviously serious and possibly fatal, though it is uncertain whether the term itself refers necessarily to lethal harm. Indeed, Exodus 21:23–25 assumes the harm could be fatal (“life for life”) or not (“eye for eye”).489 The term translated “judges” (palil) at the end of verse 22 is also relatively rare and also disputed, with possible translations of the relevant clause including “And he shall pay as the judges determine” (ESV), “The payment [is] to be based on reckoning” (JPS), or “[He] shall pay . . . in accordance with an assessment.”490 Since it seems unlikely a husband would be allowed to demand whatever he wanted, it would make good sense if this phrase were in some way indicating a standard or a supervising third party that ensured the demand was reasonable.491

TABLE 2.6: Three Approaches to Exodus 21:22–25

In light of the above the two scenarios could be approached in three different ways (cf. table 2.6). Deciding between these approaches is complex. Some ancient Near Eastern laws concerning a stricken pregnant woman discuss harm to the child and harm to the mother;492 this favors the first or third approach. Other ancient Near Eastern laws, however, appear to focus only on the harm to the child;493 this favors the second approach. Further, in most ancient Near Eastern laws the man who causes an early miscarriage is subject only to a fine, favoring the first approach, but in at least one instance he is subject to death,494 favoring the second or third. As noted above, however, it is also true that the relevant ancient Near Eastern laws seem to presume that a woman who gives birth prematurely typically miscarries (cf. above). If this was indeed the historical reality, it speaks against the second and third approaches (since scenario 1 in those approaches is now unlikely) and in favor of the first.

If the first approach is correct, then the payment of only a fine in verse 22 need not imply “that the fetus did not have the status of a viable human.”495 From a broader biblical perspective the way in which other texts describe the Lord’s personal involvement in the formation of children in the womb presumes that they are as much in the image of God as those fully born (Job 31:15; Ps. 139:13–15; Jer. 1:5). These are not simply “embryos”; they are little image bearers. But even if we stay in the present context we see only a few verses later that fines are allowed in the case of a goring ox in which fully grown humans are killed (Ex. 21:30–32). In other words the presence of a fine does not mean we are dealing with nonviable humans. Indeed, what verse 22 and verses 30–32 share in common is that in both instances the death is indirect: the woman is struck, not the child; the ox does the killing, not the person. This indirectness may explain why the guilty party is able to pay a fine instead of having to flee to a city of refuge (as in 21:13; the indirectness would also make this situation very different than abortion, which is direct and intentional). Striking the woman, however, is direct, and thus the law of talion is invoked in verses 23–25 to make clear the man will be subject to death if the woman dies (“life for life”) and to lesser penalties if she is injured (“eye for eye”).496

This leads to the law of talion itself: “You shall pay life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth,” (vv. 23–24). This appears to be a stereotyped formula that is repeated in full here even if not all the wounds apply in this specific situation (such as a “burn”).497 As I wrote elsewhere on the similar penalty described in Leviticus 24:19–20:

This law came to be known as the lex talionis, a Latin phrase that translates roughly as the “law of compensation in kind.”498 Similar expressions are found elsewhere in Old Testament [Exod. 21:23–25; Deut. 19:16–21] and ancient Near Eastern law.499 Interpreted literally, it would require that the same injury be done to the offender as the offender has committed. Such an approach seems to have been taken in ancient Israel with regard to murder: the killer was to die [cf. Lev. 24:19–20 with 24:21c–d]. In non-lethal cases, however, the law seems to have been taken “as a guiding principle, ‘a handy way of saying that the punishment must fit the crime.’”500

When physical injuries are treated in Exodus 21:18–19 and 21:26–27, in neither situation is there a literalistic application of the lex talionis. Indeed, such an approach would be of no real help to the injured party. What is found in both cases is proper justice: an injured person must be supported until becoming self-sufficient again (vv. 18–19); a servant is released from the tyranny of a cruel master (vv. 26–27).

In short, the law of compensation in kind was not some literalistic, primitive form of vengeance. In Israel, it functioned as a guiding principle to ensure judges gave penalties appropriate to the crimes—the very principle that is “the basis for all civilized legal systems” today.501 In this way, the law actually served to limit vengeance, which often demands a penalty far exceeding the bounds of justice.502 It emphasized instead that justice be fair and equitable.503

Practically speaking, this meant that, if the woman died, the man who struck her would also be put to death: “life for life” goes into effect (and thus the mention of the law of talion instead of simply a notice of a fine). But if the woman was injured, he would need to give financial compensation in keeping with the nature of the injury.504

21:26–27 As noted directly above, these verses show that the “eye for eye” principle is to be applied not in a literalistic way but as a means of assuring that the penalty is appropriate to the crime. Blinding the eye of the master or knocking out his tooth would do the servant little good. Instead, the servant is freed from the master’s tyrannical rule, which also means any outstanding debts are cancelled. Clearly, Israelite masters are not to treat their servants as chattels but to respect them as image bearers of the divine King.505

21:28–32 Five different cases are considered. In the first an ox for the first time gores a man or woman to death (v. 28). Because of the incomparable value that humans have as God’s image bearers, the ox must be killed (cf. Gen. 9:5). In addition its meat may not be eaten. Is this because it is considered to be defiled with bloodguilt? Or because having a barbecue at the cost of someone’s life would be grotesque? Or both? The text does not say. It makes clear, however, that the ox’s owner is not liable, since this is new behavior.

In the second case the owner has been warned about his ox’s dangerous behavior but has not restrained it properly (Ex. 21:29). This is culpable negligence, and he is now liable for any death that occurs; not only is the ox killed but the owner as well.

The third case identifies a possible way the owner may escape death: “If a ransom is imposed on him, then he shall give for the redemption of his life whatever is imposed on him” (v. 30). The text says not, “If he decides to pay a ransom,” but, “If a ransom is imposed on him.” The option of paying ransom is not up to him but is determined by a third party, presumably the family of the slain person.506 Should they allow the ox’s guilty owner to pay a ransom to rescue his life, it would be an act of sheer grace on their part. They may hold him fully liable due to his negligence (v. 29), but they may also view him as being guilty of a type of manslaughter (instead of murder) and allow him to ransom himself from death.507

The fourth case specifies that, even if the victim is not fully grown (“a man’s son or daughter”), the situation is the same as the death of an adult, and the ox’s owner will be dealt with “according to this same rule” (v. 31). Whether the “rule” in question is that of verse 30 in particular or verses 28–30 as a whole is debatable, although, since verse 30 presumes verses 28–29, the endpoint is the same either way.

The fifth case answers the question, “If the person killed is a servant, what type of financial compensation goes to the servant’s master?” The answer is thirty shekels (v. 32), that is, roughly 12 oz (340 grams; for details cf. comment on 30:11–16). The case does not answer the question, To what extent do the stipulations of 21:29–31 also apply? That verse 32 mentions the ox must be stoned could be taken to mean, “You pay the thirty shekels and stone the ox and nothing else.” But the fact that the stoning requirement repeats statements from the preceding laws (cf. vv. 28, 29) could also be taken to mean that those stipulations are assumed to apply in addition to the thirty-shekel fine. I lean toward the latter of these options on the basis of the treatment of the one killing a servant in verse 20 and also because a servant could be from a local Israelite family (v. 2), and it is hard to imagine that stepping into that role somehow nullifies the family’s right to seek justice according to the stipulations of verses 29–31.