1. And these are the laws. After the ten divine imperatives, couched in absolute terms and addressed to each Israelite in the second-person singular, we have a series of miscellaneous laws formulated casuistically (i.e., according to hypothetical case: “Should a man do X, . . .”). This collection of laws, which make up chapter 21 through chapter 23, is conventionally called the Book of the Covenant, in accordance with the phrase used in 24:7 (“And he [Moses] took the book of the covenant and read it in the hearing of the people”), though some scholars have questioned whether the text referred to that Moses reads to the people is really the same as this legal miscellany. It is probably one of the oldest collections of law in the Bible; it exhibits numerous parallels with (as well as divergences from) the Code of Hammurabi, with sundry other Sumerian and Akkadian codes, and with Hittite law, all of which have been abundantly studied in the scholarly literature.

you shall set before them. The “you” (singular) is Moses.

2. Should you buy a Hebrew slave. Pointedly, the first laws in the group deal with the regulation of slavery, addressed in the narrative situation to an audience of newly freed slaves. That situation may dictate the somewhat unexpected designation, “Hebrew slave” (rather than “a slave from your people” or “a slave from your brothers”) because that was the identity of the Israelites in the eyes of their Egyptian masters, “Hebrew” generally being a foreigner’s label for an Israelite.

and in the seventh he shall go free. What is clearly involved is not chattel slavery but what amounts to a kind of indentured servitude. The Bible does not question this institution but sets certain limits on it, and, as one can see in the subsequent laws, the slave retains basic human rights.

3. by himself. The unusual Hebrew term, begapo, might mean, according to Umberto Cassuto, “the corner, or wing [of a garment].” If this is the case, it would have the idiomatic force of “with the shirt on his back” (and nothing else).

4. the wife and her children shall be her master’s. The evident implication is that the master gave this slavegirl to the male slave for breeding purposes, not for sentimental reasons. The next verse, however, reflects a recognition that even in such brutally economic circumstances the man may develop an emotional attachment to the woman and to their children.

5. if the slave should solemnly say. The emphatic force here of the infinitive followed by the conjugated verb ʾamor yoʾmar is to indicate a performative speech-act, a binding public declaration.

6. make him approach the gods and make him approach the door or the doorpost. The word translated here as “gods” (ʾelohim) is a famous crux. Though plural in form, when it is treated grammatically as a singular it usually means “God.” When it is treated as a plural it usually means “gods,” although occasionally it appears to designate some sort of celestial beings who are less than God. In this sequence one cannot tell whether it is singular or plural. Rabbinic tradition sought to avert any possible scandal in the verse by interpreting ʾelohim as “judges,” but the philological evidence for that understanding is slim. The most plausible proposal that has been made is that the reference is to household gods: there are several ancient Near Eastern documents indicating that these were placed by the doorposts, and that certain legal declarations regarding a person’s relation to the household were made in their presence, at the doorway. This premonotheistic detail may reflect the very old age of the law, and the repetitive phrase “and make him approach the door or doorpost” may well be a somewhat later gloss intended to explain what “made him approach the ʾelohim” meant. It certainly makes more sense that the door in question should be the door of the household to which the slave is perpetually committing himself and not, as others have claimed, the door of a sanctuary or of a judicial court.

pierce his ear with an awl. There is no consensus on the symbolism, though it is not implausible that the ear might be thought of as the organ of obedience. Perhaps no symbolism is intended, and piercing the ear is a way of permanently marking the perpetual slave without serious mutilation, or perhaps the pierced ear might have been used to wear a ring bearing the master’s mark or initial.

7. And should a man sell his daughter as a slavegirl. From what follows, it is clear that the impoverished father is selling her not to perform labor, as is the case of the male slave, but as some sort of concubine. It is for this reason that the conditions of her manumission differ from those of the male slave.

8. If she seem bad in the eyes of her master. That is, if he finds anything about her that disinclines him to keep her as a sexual partner.

an outsider. The Hebrew ʿam nokhri (elsewhere, it would mean “a foreign people”) is probably an archaic social term—another reflection of the ancient character of the document—with ʿam meaning “kin.”

broken faith with her. Literally, “betrayed her.” He has not honored his commitment to keep her as concubine.

10. meals. The Hebrew uses a relatively rare term for “meat,” clearly a synecdoche for food.

wardrobe. Literally, “covering.”

conjugal rights. Although this translation reflects the strong consensus of Hebrew commentators, the term ʿonah is much in dispute. Since the master has rejected the woman as a bedmate, it does seem odd to require him to make conjugal visits. Some have interpreted the term as “housing” by relating it to maʿon, “habitation.” Others, noting a husband’s threefold obligation in other ancient Near Eastern documents to provide his wife food, clothing, and oil or unguents, propose that ʿonah refers to such cosmetic necessities, although the philological grounds for that claim are uncertain.

12. He who strikes a man. Cassuto notes a general structural parallel to the Decalogue. The list of laws begins with regulations about slavery, just as the first commandment begins by mentioning the liberation from slavery. The next group of laws begins with murder, just as the second half of the Decalogue does.

13. I shall set apart for you a place to which he may flee. The presupposition of this institution of places of sanctuary for people who have committed involuntary manslaughter is vendetta justice: the members of the family bent on “redeeming the blood” (geʾulat hadam) of their dead kinsman, even if the killing was unintended, would not be permitted to penetrate these towns of refuge. Eventually, the state took over all functions of executing justice and these provisions became anachronistic.

14. from My altar you shall take him. As in other cultures, the altar was a place of sanctuary, and someone accused of bloodguilt could flee to the altar and cling to one of the carved horns at its corners in a plea to be held free of harm. This is what Joab does in 1 Kings 2 in an effort to escape Solomon’s henchmen. Solomon orders him to be taken from the altar and executed—perhaps in accordance with this law, for Joab has killed two commanders of Israel in cold blood.

17. vilifies. The Hebrew qilel is the precise antithesis of “honor” (kabed) in “honor your father and your mother,” the word for “honor” being derived from a root that means “heavy” or “important” and the word for “vilify” or “treat with contempt” (King James Version, “curse”) being derived from a root that means “light” or “worthless.”

18. falls ill. Literally, “falls to bed.”

19. he shall surely stand good for his cure. Literally, “he shall surely cure him.”

20. they die . . . they shall surely be avenged. The Hebrew says “he” in each instance because the masculine form has grammatical precedence, referring to him or her. Since both the female and the male slave are mentioned as possible objects of the violence, the translation, in order to avoid the awkward “he or she,” switches to the plural. The same procedure is followed in several subsequent verses.

21. But if a day or two they should survive. The sad implication of this stipulation is that vigorous beating of slaves, male and female alike, was assumed to be an acceptable practice. If the slave lasted a couple of days and then died, the inference would be that the master had not intended the death but had merely overdone the beating. If the slave died on the spot, this would be evidence that the master had meant to kill him, or at least was guilty of involuntary manslaughter.

for they are his money. That is, it would be counter to the master’s own interest to take the life of a slave after having purchased him to perform service, so the presumption is that unless the slave dies during the beating, there was no clear intention on the part of the master to kill him.

22. and her fetus come out. The Masoretic Text reads weyatsʾu yeladeha, “and her children came out,” which amounts to the same thing but seems a little odd, especially because of the plural “children.” The Samaritan text and the Septuagint both have weyatsaʾ weladah, “and her fetus came out.”

no other mishap. The reference would have to be to the death, or at least grave impairment, of the pregnant woman. “Other” is supplied in the translation for the sake of clarity.

by the reckoning. The meaning of the Hebrew biflilim is uncertain. Some interpreters link the terms to judicial authority. The Code of Hammurabi is equally concerned about liability for induced miscarriages but, unlike this law, makes discriminations according to the social standing of the injured party.

23–25. a life for a life, an eye for an eye . . . a bruise for a bruise. The pitiless punishment by equivalent injury of this famous lex talionis—again, with a parallel in the Code of Hammurabi—has created much discomfort and elicited tracts of commentary. It should be observed that the connection with the pregnant woman injured by brawlers is highly tenuous: burning, or even the loss of tooth or eye, in that situation seems far-fetched; and in any case, someone who has committed involuntary manslaughter would not be subject to the death penalty. The notion, therefore, that this is a fragment of an archaic law code stitched into this text seems plausible. The preponderant view of Jewish commentators in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages is that in each of the cases stipulated here, the intention is for the liable party to pay monetary compensation for the loss incurred. The possibility should not be excluded that this was the original intention: monetary compensation for such losses was a widespread practice in ancient Near Eastern codes, and as some of the medieval commentators point out, it would have been unfeasible to implement the lex talionis literally with equity (e.g., how does one punish someone who has caused a man a partial loss of eyesight in one eye?).

26. should a man strike the eye of his male slave. There is an obvious associative link with the “eye for an eye” of the previous unit. Here it is perfectly clear that the loss of a bodily faculty is assigned monetary value.

28. an ox. The ox is the exemplary instance of liability for one’s animals in ancient Near Eastern law (and afterward in the Talmud).

the ox shall surely be stoned. This punishment in effect falls on the owner, who loses the whole value of his animal. But there is also a sense that the ox itself has been tainted by destroying a human life and so it is killed, not slaughtered, as a murderer would be killed, and it is unfit to be eaten.

the ox’s owner is clear. He has no further liability in the death because this is a case in which there was no precedent for the ox’s action and hence, given the usually pacific nature of oxen, the owner could not be expected to anticipate the goring.

29. a gorer from time past. In the case of an ox known to be habitually violent, the owner’s failure to keep it safely penned in is an act of criminal negligence resulting in death.

30. If restitution be set for him. There remains a loophole of monetary compensation for the negligent owner of the goring ox because even criminal negligence is not the same as malicious intention to kill.

37. Should a man steal an ox or a sheep. We now move on from torts to laws of theft. The reason for a distinction in penalty between ox and sheep has been debated, but the simplest explanation is that the ox, a draft animal as well as an animal that can be slaughtered for its meat, is more valuable than the sheep.