Original Meaning
SCHOLARS HAVE GENERALLY REGARDED Leviticus 27, containing additional laws and a summary (v. 34), as an appendix to the book after its climactic conclusion in chapter 26, which ends with a summary (26:46).1 C. Carmichael, however, points out that it is connected with chapters 25–26 by its references to the Jubilee and continuation of the parallels with Genesis 47 that appear in Leviticus 25:
Pharaoh acquires both the Egyptians’ possessions and their persons, and he enters into a transaction with them when he gives them seed to grow in the fields. Leviticus 27 addresses issues about Yahweh’s claims to an Israelite’s possessions and person, and the transactions that follow.2
If chapters 25–27 of Leviticus constitute a concluding unit, their order is logical. In chapter 25 the sabbatical (25:1–7) and then Jubilee provisions (25:8–55) provide the basis for later references to sabbatical (26:34–35) and then Jubilee years (27:17–24). Chapters 25–26 form a subunit framed by an inclusio: reference to Mount Sinai at the beginning of chapter 25 (v. 1) and again at the end of chapter 26 (v. 46). So chapter 27 must come after this subunit rather than immediately following chapter 25. Placement of the dramatic climax in chapter 26 at the center of chapters 25–27 rather than at the very end of the book may disturb us, but it would be artistically satisfying from the viewpoint of ancient Hebrews, who often put their most weighty literary expressions at the centers of literary structures. Because chapter 27 is the real end of the book, it requires a concluding summary (27:34), echoing the earlier summary in 26:46.
Leviticus 27 regulates gifts to the sanctuary: vows of persons (vv. 2–8) and animals (vv. 9–13), dedications of houses (vv. 14–15) and fields (vv. 16–25), firstborn animals (vv. 26–27), proscribed/banned items (vv. 28–29), and tithes (vv. 30–33). The focus of this chapter on holy things links it with earlier portions of Leviticus.
Verse 2 introduces the topic of votive gifts in typical case law style: “When [ki] a person makes an extraordinary vow to YHWH concerning the (fixed) valuation of a human being. . . .”3 Apparently what is extraordinary about such a vow is that the gift is a human being (cf. Num. 6:2).4 Rather than human sacrifice (cf. Judg. 11:30–31, 35–36, 39) or lifelong service at the sanctuary (1 Sam. 1:11, 24–28; 2:11), the Lord will receive what amounts to a redemption price corresponding to the valuation of an individual as fixed by the following scale:
Gender | Age | Valuation in shekels |
male female | 20–60 years " | 50 30 |
male female | 5–20 years " | 20 10 |
male female | 1 mo.–5 years " | 5 3 |
male female | 60+ years " | 15 10 |
The variables are gender and age. In this list, ages begin with the prime of adulthood and decrease to infancy, after which valuations of elderly persons are specified.
Verse 8 makes a concession for a poor person who wants to make such a vow but cannot afford the usual amount. The priest lowers the valuation of the vowed person in proportion to the vower’s ability to pay. Earlier in Leviticus we have seen concessions for the poor in terms of less expensive sacrifices (5:7–13; 12:8; 14:21–32; cf. 1:14–17). However, 27:8 is unique in giving a priest the authority to specify a lesser value for a gift to the Lord.
Verses 9–10 constitute a subcase. If that which is vowed is a sacrificeable animal, it becomes holy so that no other animal can take its place, even a better animal. Attempted substitution will result in both animals becoming holy to the Lord, meaning that they will belong to the sanctuary (v. 10).
An Israelite can also vow an unclean and therefore unsacrificeable animal that can be used by the priests for work or sold (v. 11; cf. v. 27). In this case a priest will assign the value of this gift to the Lord (v. 12). The value will be relevant for sale of the animal to someone else or for redemption if the owner wants to keep the animal, in which case he or she will pay the value plus one fifth (v.13). This 20 percent charge is the same amount as the penalty for sacrilege in 5:16. Although redemption is not a sin and requires no reparation offering, it is related to sacrilege in that it withdraws something from the holy domain.
Verse 14 opens up a new main case (introduced by ki, “When . . .”) of non-votive dedications/consecrations. Unlike vows, which are conditional promises to be fulfilled in the future, such dedications go into effect immediately. Consecration (Hiphil of qdš) of a house works like a vow of an unclean animal: The priest sets the value and any redemption requires that amount plus a fifth (vv. 14–15). Notice that the sanctuary and its priesthood will own the auxiliary property, as did temples elsewhere in the ancient Near East. In addition to all their other competencies, Israel’s priests are cattle judges and real estate appraisers!
Unlike a house, ancestral land cannot be permanently sold, but it reverts to its original owner in the Jubilee year. Therefore, the value of a piece of land is based on its potential agricultural yield—as indicated by the amount of seed required to sow it—until the next Jubilee. Verses 16–25 deal with two possibilities: Either the dedicator is the original owner (vv. 16–21) or he has bought (really leased) someone else’s land (vv. 22–25). Redemption by the original owner requires an extra fifth, as expected (v. 19).
The meaning of verses 20–21 is not transparent: “But if he does not redeem the field but has sold the field to another, it shall no longer be redeemable; when the field is released in the Jubilee, it shall be holy to YHWH, as a proscribed field; it belongs to the priest.”5 As M. Haran has shown, the key to understanding this passage is the tense of the verb “has sold” (Qal of mkr) in verse 20. Whereas the other verbs in the same verse are imperfect, this one is perfect, indicating the pluperfect sense of prior action: The owner who inherited the land consecrated it after having sold it. Ordinarily the land would simply revert to the owner at the Jubilee. But by dedicating it to the sanctuary after already selling its use to someone else until the Jubilee, the original owner indicates his intention to dedicate something over and above that which he has already sold, namely, permanent ownership. Therefore at the next Jubilee, when the property would normally revert to him, it instead becomes the permanent property of the priesthood. It is like ḥerem property—something irrevocably “banished” to the sphere of holiness (see comments on v. 28).6
The remaining laws of Leviticus 27 cover restrictions on firstborn animals, proscribed things, and tithes. Israelites cannot consecrate firstborn animals to the Lord because they are already his (v. 26). However, an impure firstborn animal can be redeemed (see v. 13; cf. Ex. 13:13).
Verses 28–29 concern the intense ḥerem category of proscribed things or persons that have been irredeemably consecrated to the divine sphere and therefore are “most holy to the LORD.” We are most familiar with this category in terms of sacral devotion to destruction within the context of warfare against other nations (Num. 21:2–3; Deut. 7:2; 20:16–17; Josh. 6:17; 7:1; 1 Sam. 15:3).7 Under extreme circumstances, the Israelites could also destroy their own rebels in the same way, whether in civil war (Judg. 21:10–11) or in peace as a judicial penalty for worship of a deity other than the Lord (Ex. 22:20; Deut. 13:12–18). Leviticus 27:28–29, however, refers to a peacetime ḥerem. J. Milgrom succinctly explains the thrust of this legislation:
In sum, the ḥērem imposed voluntarily by the owner on his property, whether it is his slaves, animals, or tenured fields, transfers it to permanent sanctuary ownership where it may be neither sold nor redeemed because of its most sacred status. But persons who are declared ḥērem by some outside body (presumably, an authorized court) must be put to death.8
Tithes are like a firstborn animal in that they are already holy to the Lord and can be redeemed (vv. 30–32; cf. vv. 26–27). When a tithe consists of every tenth animal, no substitution can be made without forfeiting both animals (vv. 32–33; cf. v. 10).
The book of Leviticus ends: “These are the commands the LORD gave Moses on Mount Sinai for the Israelites” (27:34). This echoes the earlier conclusion in 26:46: “These are the laws, rules, and the rituals that YHWH established between himself and the Israelites at Mount Sinai through Moses.”9
Bridging Contexts
MONETARY WORTH OF A PERSON. Why vow the monetary worth of a person? We speak of a person being worth his or her weight in gold. The idea is an old one. The mother of Domitia took it seriously when she vowed her daughter’s weight in gold and paid it at Jerusalem.10 Nevertheless, the idea of vowing the monetary worth of a human being (as in 27:1–8) seems strange to us.
Scholars have explored possible rationales for the valuations of persons in 27:3–7. Because this scale places the highest valuations on persons in the prime of adulthood, when their work productivity is at a maximum, it appears that this system of relative worth has to do with the benefit that the sanctuary will receive if the vowed person belongs to it as a servant. The fact that female valuations of work capacity are as high as they are, taking into account the female responsibility for bearing and raising children, indicates that women were an important part of Israelite labor force.11
There are some correlations between the valuations in Leviticus 27 and prices that individuals would bring if they were to be enslaved. For example, the brothers of young Joseph sold him as a slave for twenty shekels of silver (Gen. 37:28), which is the same as the valuation of a five to twenty-year-old male in Leviticus 27:5. Also, to ransom his country from the king of Assyria, King Menahem of northern Israel exacted fifty shekels of silver from each successful man (2 Kings 15:20), which equals the Leviticus 27 valuation of a twenty to sixty-year-old man in the prime of life (Lev. 27:3) and a reasonable price for a male adult slave in Mesopotamia.12
Yet several factors distance the valuations in Leviticus 27 from prices of slaves.13 (1) In Exodus 21:32 the fixed amount of reparation to the master of a male or female slave gored to death by an ox is thirty shekels of silver. This agrees with the valuation of a female adult in Leviticus 27:4, but not a male (27:3). (2) Unlike slave prices, the scale in Leviticus 27 is fixed rather than fluctuating according to market conditions. (3) Unlike slave prices, the scale in Leviticus 27 does not take into account factors such as an individual’s appearance or strength, which determines actual productivity. As Philo pointed out, the fixed valuations of Leviticus are egalitarian: Everyone of a certain gender and age is worth the same amount.14
Not only are the valuations fixed in Leviticus 27; so is the currency: “the sanctuary shekel, twenty gerahs to the shekel” (v. 25). Another valuation of a human being set according to this currency is the redemption price of five shekels for one-month-old firstborn sons (Num. 18:16). Five shekels agrees with the valuation of a male from one month to twenty years of age in Leviticus 27:6.
According to Numbers 3:12–13, 45–46, the Levites took the place of the firstborn Israelites at the time of the initial census (cf. 8:16–18). We learn what redemption means in this context by seeing what happened to the Levites: Because they belonged to the Lord instead of the firstborn, they became the Lord’s servants, to work for his sanctuary under the supervision of the priests (Num. 3, 8).
When an Israelite vowed to dedicate to the Lord the valuation of a human being if he (God) would provide a certain benefit, it was as if the vowed person would become the servant of the sanctuary, as Samuel did when Hannah fulfilled her vow (1 Sam. 1:11, 24–28; 2:11). This is a valuable gift indeed. But why would someone want to make such a pricey vow? To request something major from the Lord, as Hannah did.
If every vowed person became a sanctuary servant, the priests would become inundated with helpers dependent on them but for whom they lacked sufficient work. So the legislation of Leviticus 27 provides a solution: Israelites can still vow persons, but what they actually give to the sanctuary functions as a redemption price according to a fixed scale that extends from a parallel with the five-shekel redemption price of one-month-old firstborn males.
Taking into account wage levels in ancient Israel, valuations of persons in Leviticus 27 are not cheap. For example, in Judges 17:10 Micah offered a young Levite: “Live with me and be my father and priest, and I’ll give you ten shekels of silver a year, your clothes and your food.” At that rate, if an Israelite saved 100 percent of wages over basic living expenses, it would take a year to earn enough to vow a five to twenty-year-old or a female older than sixty years (Lev. 27:5, 7). Vowing an adult male would require five years (27:3). However, so that the poor would not be excluded from the benefit of making such vows, Leviticus 27 allows a priest to set a lower valuation (27:8).
Contemporary Significance
REAL WORTH OF A PERSON. What is a person worth? It depends what you mean. The physical materials in a dead person’s body have little commercial value unless organs are used for transplants or a cadaver belongs to a medical school. A living person, however, is valuable for work productivity. Such labor or its potential explains why ancient Israelites could have prices for human beings. These prices reflected what persons did rather than what they were. Likewise, a Forbes estimate that someone is “worth” a certain amount of money is talking about what that person has as a result of what he or she has done or received rather than about intrinsic worth.
So what is a person really worth? The fact that Numbers 35:31 forbids accepting a ransom of any amount for the life of a murderer reflects the concept that human life is priceless. Justice demands that a murderer must pay with his life because nothing else is equivalent to the value of the life he has taken.15 The afterlife is also costly:
No man can redeem the life of another
or give to God a ransom for him—
the ransom for a life is costly,
no payment is ever enough—
that he should live on forever
and not see decay. (Ps. 49:7–9)
Why is a person so valuable? Each one fills a unique place in a web of relationships. A beloved spouse, parent, sibling, child, or other relative or friend is irreplaceable. Economic, physical, and emotional consequences of losing such an individual may differ, but love puts the value of a relationship beyond price.
My understanding of what a human being is worth made a quantum leap in the early hours of September 5, 1991, when I met my daughter for the first time in a delivery room. Just after she was born, the obstetrician placed her on a table so that assistants could make sure everything was all right. Exposed and examined by strange hands before anyone had even welcomed her into the world, she wailed in protest. That was too much for me. I went over and put my face down close to hers so that she could see me. Then I said softly, “Hello Sarah.” She instantly stopped crying. Apparently she recognized my voice. She looked into my eyes and I looked into hers. At that moment a relationship was born. She could do nothing but take my time, energy, and money, but I would die for that child.
Of course, it makes sense that a person made in the image of God (Gen. 1:26; 9:6) is of inestimable value. How can anyone put a price on the image of God? Because we do not fully comprehend the Original, we cannot appraise our own worth. Life that comes from the holy Creator is sacred. Therefore treating others as if their lives are cheap is profanity and sacrilege.
Any notion that we may have figured out our intrinsic worth is swept aside by a mystery: “For God so loved the world that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever believes in him shall not perish but have eternal life” (John 3:16). God’s gift was not a conditional vow, neither was it a money substitute, nor was his beloved Son only made in his image as a human being, nor was he given merely to provide live service (cf. Col. 1:19–20). His love puts the value of every human being way beyond price.