16:18–20 Every local center is to appoint “judges and officers.” Officers have a record-keeping function (cf. comment on 1:14–18). These officials are usually listed first with the judges, but they appear to have a subordinate function. The officers and judges are appointed by the people, much like the judges in the wilderness (1:9–17). The participation of the community is a critical component in the selection of its officers. Qualifications for the execution of justice are the same as when judges were first chosen: recognized leaders must have demonstrated their wisdom and shown an understanding of how to assess situations. The judicial system of the wilderness was a temporary provision. Once the nation was organized as a state, a centrally structured judicial system was necessary. Nothing is said of the relationship between elders and judges. It is likely that judges were chosen from among the elders. When Moses was unable to carry the burden of the people, God instructed him to select leaders from among the elders (Num. 11:16–17). The same officers (Hb. shoterim) are named there. The priests also had a role in exercising justice (cf. Deut. 17:9), but nothing suggests they were among the appointed judges. In later times judges were appointed by national figures, but royally appointed judges are limited to Jerusalem.

The requirements for impartial justice are addressed to the people, not merely to the judges (v. 19). These three stipulations are reiterated frequently in the Bible. Bribes are literally a “gift” (shohad), which corrupt officials claim as a payment for services (Isa. 1:23). The metonymy is natural; gifts often imply some sense of reciprocation, since receiving gifts can leave a person indentured to the giver. For a judge, even a gift accepted as a fee is unacceptable because it will tend to influence decisions. The explanation at the end of the verse suggests that this is not simply a bribe. The closing appeal of this section emphasizes that the objective pursuit of justice is always to the benefit of everyone.

16:21–17:1 The sequences in the exposition of the laws are frequently tangential; laws are related, but they are not given in an orderly or topical fashion. Josephus said that Moses left the laws in disarray, written as he had learned them from God (Antiquities 4.197). Ancient Near Eastern laws are often concatenated by means of assonance or key terms. In this case, it may be that the form of the verb for not perverting justice in 16:19 (Hb. tatteh) links to not planting (tittaʿ; v. 21) an “Asherah.” The three prohibitions that follow are representative of cult worship and are natural examples of issues judges would need to adjudicate in a covenant context.42 It is explicitly said that an Asherah is a tree that is planted (v. 21). Such a place of worship was constituted by a leveled stone platform beside a tree or a grove of trees. The term Asherah is regularly used as synecdoche for the whole platform and its altar.43 Such platforms were characterized by an “altar” (mizbeach) and a “pillar” (matsebah), all technical terms for ritual artifacts. The pillar was an erect stone representing a Canaanite god. With the centralization envisaged by Deuteronomy, all such platforms for worship are forbidden for Israelites. Israel must have its own specified place of worship that does not include these cultic items.

Sacrifices are to be brought to the central location. Such sacrifices are not regular food. These are a confession of divine provision, as Moses explains. As representative food, such animals are dedicated—they are holy and therefore cannot be defective in any way. Judges might be called upon to make decisions as to whether an animal is qualified to be representative in this fashion.

17:2–7 Moses describes the procedure that is to be followed in the locations at which judges have been selected. Deuteronomy here again is inclusive, with its reference to both men and women; women have their own status and carry their own responsibility. This is the only instance in Deuteronomy of the phrase translated “transgressing his covenant” (Hb. laʿabor berito). This verb is used regularly to speak of crossing over a territory. It may be used again deliberately in 29:12, where God leads Israel to “enter into the sworn covenant.” Those who have crossed into the covenant by means of an oath are liable if they then deny that oath in leaving the covenant by crossing over any of its stipulations. Denial of the covenant oath could take any form of subservience to the creation rather than the Creator. The heavenly bodies are typically represented as gods in other religions (e.g., the sun god Shemesh, or Baal as rider of the clouds). Allegations that this has taken place must be investigated very thoroughly; this is the most serious of offenses, with an ultimate penalty of death, since the words of the oath are taken in the name of Yahweh. However, it is all too easy for disgruntled individuals to lay dubious charges. Such cases would not easily be proven, for it would take the agreement of two or three independent witnesses. The integrity of the witnesses is tested, in that they must be the ones taking the initiative in an execution. Any false representation in this instance could not be atoned.

17:8–13 The central court is not a court of appeal but a court of referral for those cases that cannot be determined. The cases given as examples at Mount Sinai are good examples of subjective situations (Ex. 21–23). Homicide might be unintended or might be a case of willful planned attack (Ex. 21:12–14); situations of missing property could be complicated by circumstances (Ex. 22:6–14). Assault could involve the loss of an unborn child or various kinds of permanent bodily injury, for which appropriate monetary compensation would need to be determined (Ex. 21:22–25). Revenge is never permitted under the covenant; justice is always measured in terms of appropriate compensation. This is one of the ways Israelite law is unlike that of all other known law codes.

The composition of the central court is not specified. The role of the priest in the judicial system is mentioned only in Deuteronomy (19:17). Priests are otherwise involved in those cases that cannot be solved and must be referred to God through oaths, the Urim and Thummim (Ex. 28:29–30; Num. 27:21; 1 Sam. 28:6; Ezra 2:63), or ritual ordeals (Num. 5:11–31). It may be that Deuteronomy provides a role for priests in the judicial system apart from sacred rites because of their knowledge of the law and their role in teaching the regulations of the covenant (Lev. 10:11). Priests are also responsible for retaining copies of the Torah (Deut. 17:18; 31:9, 24–26). Priests may well have been regarded as the experienced interpreters of covenant responsibilities. Ancient law did not operate in casuistic fashion, as does modern law. Laws were given as examples, rather than precedents, to provide guidance in types of cases, but even so correct interpretation of the intended outcome was very important.

The decisions of the central court may not be disregarded, either by another judge or by the individual. Dismissing a court decision is a capital crime even if the punishment for the crime committed is not a capital offense. The involvement of the priest in such cases indicates that God is involved in the decision, which makes its disregard a capital case.

17:14–20 The king of Israel described in Deuteronomy is not like other nations’. The Greek translator understood this and paraphrased the word “king” (Hb. melek) as “ruler” (Gk. archōn). The only other occurrence of melek translated as archōn in the LXX is in the blessing of Balaam (Num. 23:21), where it refers to God. The king does not grant a covenant and law to the people, as in all the other nations, but must live under the covenant renewed under Moses; he must be one among his brothers (Deut. 17:15). When Israel asks for a king, it is for him to fulfill a role in the central court and exercise judgment (1 Sam. 8:5)—a function of all kings—and to provide for national defense (1 Sam. 8:20). The problem is not having a king in each of these capacities, which is provided for in the regulations of Moses. The problem with Israel’s asking for a king is their rejection of Yahweh as King (1 Sam. 8:7; cf. Judg. 8:23). It is quite impossible for Israel to have a king under the covenant when the covenant itself has been rejected by the people. Israel in this situation is like all the other nations.

It is possible, however, for God to appoint a king over Israel as part of the fulfillment of his covenant with Israel, as when God anoints his own king in Zion. God declares his loyalty to the king he has anointed (2 Sam. 7:11–17), and the king in turn declares that this people belongs to the God who has redeemed them (2 Sam. 7:18–24). The declaration that there is no other god as this who has redeemed a people for himself through great and awesome deeds is particularly Deuteronomic. In establishing his king, God at the same time secures a covenant people for himself. Psalm 2, a celebration of the anointing of David, affirms the rule of the divinely chosen king over all nations. In this psalm the rule of Israel’s king and the rule of God are fully unified. Kingship is essential to covenant, but this is not the kind of king or covenant found in other nations.

The covenant faith of Deuteronomy contrasts above all with the ideologies of Mesopotamia and Egypt, the nations with the greatest influence over Israel. In Mesopotamia, kingship was created by the gods for the well-being of human society; the king in turn created and granted laws that he gave to the people. The king was above the law. In Egypt the king was a god and therefore embodied the law.

The instructions of Moses stress proscriptions against the usual excesses of kings rather than the responsibilities of the king. The responsibility of the king, stated simply, is to lead the people in obedience to the covenant. For this reason the king is responsible to have a copy of this Torah and to read it so that he may learn to fear God, the fundamental covenant requirement. This surrender of the king to the covenant is the antithesis of human hubris typical of kings. Such hubris manifests itself chiefly in three vices characteristic of kings: military power, wealth, and a larger harem (to secure alliances with other nations and numerous offspring to act as heirs and officials). Such royal aspirations are a threat to Israel’s hope for longevity in the land.

By the measure of Deuteronomy, kingship in Israel is a failure. The first requirement is for the king to be one of God’s choosing (Deut. 17:15). The first king of Israel meets that qualification but immediately is also the king God rejects (1 Sam. 13:13). The Lord then seeks a prince for his people “after his own heart” (1 Sam. 13:14). The phrase “after his own heart” refers to the divine choice—God sets his mind (heart) on this man. God commissions Samuel to anoint David as the king of his choice (1 Sam. 16:1–13). In the narrative of Israel it is only this first criterion, the divine choice, that makes possible the continuation of the covenant and the kingdom. The consequences of David’s failures will haunt him continuously. Not empire-building capabilities but submission in repentance enables David to become the king of promise.